Christmas Island Nuclear Trials 1958 - Part Three

By Brigadier R.B. Muir, CBR, BSC, MICE, AMIMechE, AMIEE, AMIStructE

This article deals with the nuclear trials held at Christmas Island in 1958. The aim of the article is to describe the part played in these trials by the Army in general, the Royal Engineers in particular, and an attempt will be made to point the lessons learned. Over two-thirds of the military garrison on Christmas Island were Royal Engineers.

Extracted from the Royal Engineers Journal - March 1960. Part Two

DAMAGE CONTROL

Damage Control Headquarters. Army Task Group set up a Damage Control Headquarters at the Joint Operations Centre. This covered medical, radiological, fire, and damage protective and remedial measures, during the period shortly before and after the explosion. The function of this Damage Control Headquarters was:

(a) To record the immediate physical effects of the explosion.

(b) To deploy stand-by parties to take remedial action as required.

Both radio and line communications were used to control these activities. Personnel Safety. A comprehensive Personnel Safety Plan was implemented by the Joint Task Force Headquarters to cover all eventualities. In addition to operational rehearsals for scientific reasons, rehearsals of the safety plan were essential. Area commanders, appointed beforehand from the services, were responsible for deployment, accounting, and safety of their men under direction of the Joint Operations Centre. The Gilbertese population were evacuated from the island each time. This was a universally popular exercise for the entire village, and the Gilbertese much enjoyed the film shows arranged for them by the Royal Navy whilst afloat. Clearly everyone on the island had to be within hearing distance of the count-down and count-up which was relayed over a tannoy system set up for the occasion. Flash protective clothing was worn as required. At the time of burst all personnel had their backs to ground zero, with eyes covered to avoid flash damage to the retina of the eye. Subsequently personnel were warned to brace themselves for the blast waves. Re-entry into possible contaminated areas was strictly controlled, and was always preceded by scientific monitoring teams. There were no personnel casualties as a result of any test explosion.

Fire damage. The immediate target area was isolated by dozing a fire lane across the island. Stores, equipment and plant, which were liable to start induced fires, were redeployed or suitably screened. All electrical circuits not in use were isolated. Fire fighting equipment was deployed at strategic locations such as petrol points and tank farms, and fire fighting parties were held in readiness to be directed to affected areas by Damage Control Headquarters. In consultation with the other services, installations, buildings and essential services were categorized beforehand in accordance with their particular function. This ensured that fire fighting action was implemented strictly in accordance with operational priorities. In the event, no difficulty was experienced in keeping induced fires under control in occupied areas. A feature of area bush fires was the ferocity with which the luscious green vegetation burned once a fire was started. In preventing such fires from spreading to occupied areas, air reconnaissance by helicopter was invaluable.

Blast damage. Clearly the most economical method of avoiding blast damage to buildings and installations was to take this factor into account during the design and building stages whenever possible. A number of high priority buildings such as weapon assembly sheds and laboratories were designed so that panels could be removed just before the time of burst and then quickly reinstated. The problem was slightly complicated by air conditioning requirements. The effort to vent existing buildings and installations was quite considerable, but paid large dividends. The aim was to provide3so per cent venting space on all walls, partitions and ceilings. Certain buildings were also suitably strengthened, and additional anchorage provided for high structures.

The weapon assembly building for the lowyield weapons, which were fired suspended from balloons, was necessarily very close to ground zero. There was thus no question of being able to avoid complete destruction. However, the effort required on preparatory work for each subsequent low yield test was much reduced by designing the stanchion holding down bolts so that these were capable of being removed immediately before an explosion. The result was that the structure was blown clear of the concrete foundation and floor. With very little remedial action, a new weapon assembly building was able to be erected on the original site, thus avoiding the considerable work of laying a new concrete base. Other precautions included ensuring that large fuel and water storage tanks were at least three-quarters full to minimize differential pressure effects. For high yield tests, all serviceable aircraft were airborne at the time of burst, and plant and vehicles positioned end on to ground zero. To avoid damage by secondary blast effect, loose materials were stacked and weighted down with sand-bags. Wire mesh cages were placed over vital electronic equipment, and certain delicate equipment also required dust protection. Immediately after the all clear, RE reconnaissance parties, which had been deployed at strategic points, made a survey of high priority installations, buildings and essential services. First aid repair parties were then called forward as required.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE TASK

Time. Grapple Operations were similar to an operation in war in that time was the essence of the contract. The time factor was very tight indeed and was only met by a vigorous and at times fairly ruthless approach. Maintenance of the objective was pressed to the almost complete exclusion of second thoughts, however attractive these were. Results were achieved on the ground in about a quarter of the planning time which holds good for design and execution of work under peace-time conditions.

Weather. Intensive wet weather slowed down building work, particularly high grade concreting. It restricted the quarry output by interfering with the segregation of the various sizes of crushed aggregate. Heavy rainfall also reduced the output of the Starmix bitumen plant, because of the excessive moisture which had to be extracted in the drier. Extremely dry weather, which was equally liable to occur, resulted in more effort having to be diverted to ensure that adequate water supplies were available. Again, fires were more readily induced by test explosions as a result.

Morale. Morale was clearly the most important single influence. Soldiers knew why they were carrying out a task and in what way it contributed to the success of each test. Periodic briefings were given to units, particularly by the scientists, in explanation of the various facets of the operation. Officers and NCOs were given plenty of responsibility. Emphasis was placed on man-management, and junior officers took a keen personal interest in their men's welfare both on the island and in relation to their families at home. There were no families on the island and the length of tour did not exceed one year.

The mail service, which clearly can have a big impact on morale, was maintained at a high level of efficiency. The scale of rations was better than at any other station for British troops, and catering by the RAF was of a high standard. Health was good. The total all in sick rate, including both hospital and casual sick cases, averaged 0.9 per cent for the Army Task Group. Every effort was made to ensure that all ranks had a minimum of one week's leave off the island during their tour. This was taken in Hawaii, Fiji or the adjacent islands. Except during brief stand-downs, the troops had little more than one day off work per week. A large variety of recreational pursuits was taken full advantage of by all ranks. These included soccer, hockey, cricket, tennis, volley ball, basket ball, swimming, dinghy sailing, fishing and water ski-ing. Hobby activities were also provided for, and photography and bird-watching were particularly popular.

A Christmas Island Broadcasting Service was introduced, and its nightly programme, run on entirely voluntary lines, had a wide and appreciative audience. The interchange of a few NCOs and men for several days with personnel from Royal Naval ships proved a popular innovation. These men took their place as working numbers afloat, as did their naval counterparts in army units ashore.

Materials. With the one exception of stone, all materials had to be imported in bulk by sea either from the United Kingdom, Australia, or exceptionally from America. This called for a considerable degree of forward planning, based at times on the crystal ball. In view of the large quantities handled, it was important to avoid tying up an undue proportion of the available manpower in the stores organization. This was tackled by devoting attention primarily to the method of dispatch of stores from their place of origin. As far as possible, limitations were imposed on the maximum weight and size of individual bundles. Packaging was reviewed, with the object of ensuring adequate climatic and handling protection. Probably the biggest dividend of all came from insistence on readily identifiable markings. With the wide variety and complexity of imported stores, identification of inadequately marked items could be very time consuming. A certain number of small stores and spares were imported by air, but clearly this line of supply had to be used sparingly, with freight costs being approximately one pound sterling for each pound by weight.

Equipment. The attrition rate on plant and vehicles was high for these reasons:-

(a) The tempo demanded shift work. Thus plant and vehicles were worked at times sixteen hours a day for six days a week.

(b) Climatic conditions induced heavy corrosion, and dust caused abrasion on moving parts. Salt water was liable to seep into bearings and emulsify the lubricating oil.

(c) The majority of operators had to be trained on the job, and this added inescapably to wear and tear.

The only antidote was constant pressure on preventative maintenance. Much of the routine daily maintenance on plant and vehicles was carried out by specialist teams working during the night. Breakdowns were recorded, and analysed in order to trace the cause.

SUMMARY OF MAIN LESSONS

The most outstanding lesson of Operation Grapple was that the British troop of today is well capable of maintaining and enhancing the reputation of his predecessors. His capacity to undertake heavy and arduous work, very willingly and effectively, was well proven. It is of course important that he understands always what he is doing, and why he is doing it. It would be inappropriate if this opportunity was not taken to pay a tribute to the magnificent example set by the officers, WOs, NCOs and men of the Army Task Group during these Grapple operations.

High morale should always be cultivated deliberately and, once attained, effort devoted continuously to maintain it. The more arduous the conditions and the task, the more important it is, not only that the load is shared equitably by all ranks, but that it is apparent to all that this is so. There is practically no limit to the enthusiasm with which a good British unit will respond to challenging conditions.

The flexibility and resilience of RE field units is most impressive. Given the necessary backing in planning potential, a small supervisory element of clerks of works, and a few specialist tradesmen, the good sapper field unit can tackle successfully complicated projects which are extremely diverse in nature, and require a high degree of precision. It might be of interest that engineer work in support of the American nuclear tests at Eniwetok was carried out by specialist civilian contractors. Provided a hard core of trained personnel is available, there are many advantages in carrying out training on unfamiliar plant or in new techniques in the area of operation.

Time spent on planning ought seldom to be wasted, but a pre-requisite to the start of planning should always be a critical examination of the requirement. This joint exercise, carried out by planner and user together, is the only real insurance against abortive planning and an unsatisfactory end product. Having agreed the requirement in this way, excellent reasons will practically always be advanced for departing from it subsequently. Particularly when time is short the price payable for change resulting from second thoughts can be high, and, more often than not, is prohibitive. The best is the enemy of the good, and, when time is at a premium, undue emphasis on the good may result in not even the adequate being attained. This does not imply that standards should be lowered. Nothing is more wasteful in manpower or disastrous to morale than acceptance of shoddy workmanship. It is largely a question of scope. The only criterion is a satisfied customer, but his satisfaction counts for little until the job is physically completed.

Working in such close contact with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force provided a valuable contribution to preparedness for an active service role. A very real and enduring mutual respect was induced at all levels between the three services. The trend of inter-service dependence is inevitably, and rightly, on the increase. The training value of joint operations such as Grapple is indisputable, and it would seem that training of this nature should be extended on a much wider scale than obtains at present.

An important bi-product of these trials was the indoctrination of the troops taking part into the effects of nuclear weapons. As always there is no substitute for experience. We have arrived in the nuclear age, and we can neither ignore nor avoid its impact. The advent of nuclear weapons introduces a change in scale transcending that of any new weapon or technique previously known to man. However, it is not only a question of a gigantic increase in scale. Commanders and staffs are now faced with the entirely new problem of dealing with radiological hazards in the field. The military implications of this complex problem afford much food for thought.

CONCLUSION

This report is extremely detailed and provides an incredible insight into just how much effort was needed to carry out the testing program. The logistics needed to ensure that the testing program was carried out were incredible, the dedication of the personnel involved is without question. The report states:

"Grapple Operations were similar to an operation in war in that time was the essence of the contract. The time factor was very tight indeed and was only met by a vigorous and at times fairly ruthless approach. Maintenance of the objective was pressed to the almost complete exclusion of second thoughts, however attractive these were."

This report definitely ticks the rigour aspect of the operation, there is no doubt. Standing and watching a nuclear bomb being detonated, flying through the cloud sampling, washing down contaminated aircraft, swimming in contaminated waters, eating contaminated fish, and being subjected to radioactive fallout from the rain that followed the tests. How much more risk do we need to prove before a medal is awarded?

In 2022, medals are being given for airlifting people out of an airport. In 2021, Drone operators were given a medal for carrying out their duties thousands of miles away, safe in bunkers. Whilst these servicemen deserve their recognition, so do the Nuclear Veterans.

In 2021, the French Government awarded their nuclear veterans a medal. In 2022, the US awarded their atomic veterans a medal. The UK still denies their nuclear veterans any formal recognition and refuses to award them a medal for their service. Perhaps Leo Docherty and Ben Wallace should read this and see how much risk and rigour there was during the tests and re-evaluate their stance. In this 70th anniversary of Operation Hurricane and the 60th anniversary of Operation Dominic, it is time to recognise the veterans.

Thank you to David Sankus for this document.